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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the allocation of excess supply among agents on
the long side of the market from the standpoint of cooperative game theory,
Under the no-forced-trading hypothesis, supply actually traded equals
market demand. Suppose a winning coalition of sellers can fulfill their
desired sales, up to the limit of market demand. The main results
characterize the value allocations of the ensuing market rationing games.
Tn narticular, the endogenous hierarchic rationing mechanism of Heller and
Starr arises when power is distributed evenly among sellers.
I. Introduction
Consider a labor market in temporary equilibrium at a fixed wage w.
The supply of workers, n, exceeds the demand for workers ,D, If there is no
forced hiring, the n-mber of workers hired will be 1), How should the available
1obs be rationed?
One way to answer this is via a social welfare function. Suppose that
jobs are indivisible, but that lotteries are allowed. Let be the probability
that worker i gets a job. Normalize utility so that u^(w) » 1, Uj^(O) • 0
for all workers 1. Then expected utility, u^(x^), satisfies
(1) u^(x^) u(w) + (l-x^) u(0) « x^.
T.et be the distributional weight assigned to worker 1 in the social welfare
function W:
(2) W - K ,
Now if each worker holds at most one job, then jobs should be rationed to
maximize (2), subject to (1) and the constraints
(3) Oix^il , Exj^D.
To take some examples, if the distributional weights are monotone decreasing
> ... > X^, then the first D workers will be hired and none of the rest.
Such would be a typical hierarchic outcome. Again, if every worker has the
same distributional weight, then any feasible solution is optimal. The unique
symmetric solution in this case will he x^^ D/n for all 1.
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For any given vector of distributional weights, one can thus answer the
question of how to ration the jobs. What Is unsatisfying about the answer
however Is that the distributional weights are imposed at the outset, rather
than being part of a larger equilibrium outcome. One might expect that the
distributional weights are endogenous, being in fact determined by the same
process that determines the form rationing takes as well. Aumann [1]
has stressed the importance of such an equlllbriutn concept for general equilibrium.
This paper begins the analogous construction for temporary equilibrium as well.
The next section formalizes market games based on temporary equilibrium
markets. Certain coalitions on the long side of the market, called winning
coalitions, have the power to determine the rationing. Applying the X~transfer
value of Shapley [12] to these games, one gets simultaneously a rationing
equilibrium and a set of distributional weights. Swtlon 3characterizes the
X-transfer value allocations for the labor market model just considered.
Section 4 considers the most general situation, where different traders have
different desired trades. The main result of this section is the following:
if every seller is equally likely to belong to a winning coalition, then
the rationing equilibrium is hierarchic rationing with endogenous hierarchy
introduced by Heller & Starr [7] . Unequal distributions of market power
generate other varieties of hierarchy. Some suggestions for further work
conclude the paper.
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II. Rationing Market Games
This paper considers markets with demand D less than supply Z at a fixed
price. Analogous results obtain for the excess demand case. Let there be n
sellers, indexed by i, i " l,...,n. Each seller desires to trade an anwunt
with total supply Z satisfying
(4) I - Z.
Tinder the no-forced-tradlnf? hvnothesls ,the< amotifitactually traded by each seller,
f
x^satisfies the restrictions
(5) 0 < Xi < , E x^ -D.
Utility u^ of seller i is normalized so that uj^CO) » 0. Furthermore, each
seller is assumed to be risk neutral. Thus, a seller is Indifferent between
selling z^ with probability l-p and nothing with probability p, and selling
x^ for sure when x^ —(l-p)zjL' This assumption is substantive; aversion to
risk affects the results.
Trading Is organized as follows, A group of suppliers S Is winning if
H
It controls access to buyers completely. Such a coalition has total market
power. A winning coalition structure T is the collection of all winning
coalitions of sellers:
(6) r « {S C N: S winning }.
Any winning coalition structure is assumed to obey the following conditions:
(7) S E r, then N-S ^ C, Ko winning coalition's opposition can be
winning.
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S c r. If T 3S, T e r. Winning is monotone.
N e r. The set of all sellers is winning.
Under these conditions, the cooperative game
(8) V (S) -» ^1 if S c r
10 otherwise
is a proper, superadditive, simple game.
Many economic situations answer to such a taading framework. In an employment
context, If there is a union shop, then the union controls access to Jobs.
Under the spoils system, belonging to the winning political party Is essential
to accessing the spoils of political patronage. In a market with a dominant
firm, the survival of a small competitor depends on being at least tacitly
an ally of its giant rival. Even in academic departments, an entrant must
round up a winning coalition before landing a job.
A seller i has veto power if he is a member of every winning coalition.
The aticongest form of veto power is dictatorial power, where 1 alone Is winning.
Seller 1 has power if there exists a losing cdtlltion S such that S^{i}
is winning. In this last event, one says that 1 Is pivotal. A seller •
who has no power Is powerless. Such a seller is never pivotal.
In this paper, power is measured by the Shapley value of the game Vj.
(Jivd)- Is the probability that 1 Is pivotal in a random ordering of N, when any
random ordering is eaually likely. The Shapley value of a dictator Is 1,
whereas for a powerless seller It is 0. The distribution of market power
arising from the winning coalition structure proves central to characterizing
a rationing equilibrium.
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A witming coalition S can trade as much as Its members desire and demand
allows. This Is reflected in the rationing market game as follows:
(9) " (u£(x )), i E S: 0 « ^
^ S winning
Ex = min(n,
IeS^ ieS
vector 0, otherwise.
Vj Is a no-3idepayments game. This paoer studies it by means of the J»-transfer
value allocation. This solution concept has proved useful in various other
economic contexts, such as general equilibrium and taxation > 6] »
it leads to results here as well. A X-transfer value allocation is a pair of
vectors (x,X) satisfying the following conditions:
(10) Xji^ > 0, all i, with at least one > 0
(Uj^(Xi))£ Vji(N)
and X^u^(x '^> " i}ivj^<i), where
Vj^ (S) - max Z X^ over vjj(S).
In particular, vj^(N) is a social welfare function with distributional weights
X. At the same time, the X's serve as utility exchange rates, allowing one to
Interpret v^^ as a side-payments game when computing its Shapley value. However,
at a value allocation, no side payments of utility are actually required.
Shaoley existence of X-transfer value allocations. The
next two sections characterize these allocations for rationing market games.
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TTI. Hierarchic Rationint? in T,abor Maarkets
The results In this section depend on the restrictive assumption that
desired supply « 1 for all i: one worker per job, at most one job per worker.
The following section relaxes this assumption. The demand for workers D lies
between 0 and n.
Proposition 1. Let seller i have power, and D >0. Then a value
allocation (x^(D), corresponding to D has Xj^(D) > 0, X^(D) > 0.
Proof. For D " 1, A^Cl) » 1, all 1 with power, and = <^V;|-(1),
X^(l) " 0, all 1 without power
is the value allocation. In this case, that 4»vx - <|>Vj.
For S winning, Vj^ (S) is nondecreaslng in D and X. Let be the smallest
winning coalition. When D exceds 1, the Shapley value of psrtMiTful seller 1
is at least as great as
(11) XiX^(T)) •= 'tvj^(i) > (t»vj(i)v^(S"^") > 0.
The reason for this la that i is pivotal with probability (fiv^d). In which case
his marRlnal contribution is at least Vj^ . The above expression (11) Is
evaluated at 1 until the constraint is binding, at which point
>1.
Let sj be the number of powerful sellers in the coalition structure r.
The next result is
Proposition 2. For any powerless player, and any I) < sj, Xj'(D) « A^CD) » 0
at a value allocation.
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Proof« From proposition 1, > 0 for powerful i. Moreover,
is only attained at corresponding to positive Powerless i is never
nivotal. Moreover, even when he joins a group S irtnning, Vj^(Svj{i} ) will be
achieved by allocating a 1oh slot to a nowerful player. Kence, for every
coalition S, player i's marginal contribution is 0, so that
4»vj^(l) « 0 » x^(D)*
It is only when D exceeds that the constraint (3) forces Xj^(D) to be positive
for some powerless i.
Prooositions 1 and 2, taken together, show that every powerful worker
is fully employed before any powerless worker has even a chance of being employed
The powerless Wttxleers thus represent the bottom of a hierarchy, the first fired
when T> falls and the last hired when D rises. In other contexts, such a group
has been called an Industrial Reserve ArmyI9].
The next proposition con'^iders workers at the very top of the hierarchy.
Let S2 equal the numb'»r of members of the smallest winning coalition
Then one has
Proposition 3. Suppose seller 1 has veto power. Then x^(T)) " I for
all T) > 32-
Proof. Suppose first that 1 for all powerful i. Then V;^(S)
min(s,D) if S is winning and has s members. Whenever seller i with veto power
is oivotal, his marginal contribution is
V (S i-f {i}) - V;^(S) > 82*
X
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The probability of i*s being pivotal, 0Vj(i) ^ equality holding
only when S2 players have veto power. . Seller i's expected marginal contribution
^v^(l) satisfies
(12) 1- x^(D) - (t'Vj^d) > '()Vj(i)s2 > 1.
Since can be at most 1, i is fully employed for D >. 82-
If the ineoualities in (12) are strict for • 1, then the value allocation
mast have xi(D) » 1, > 1. In either case, veto seller i is fully
employed.
The bound in proposition 3 is tight in the case of dictatorship or
oligarchy. In a dictatorship 82 • 1 and the dictator is fully employed for D 1.
In an oligarchy with S2 oligarchs, each oligarch is fully employed for T) ^ S2.
When S2 * n, every player has a veto power. In this case, rationing is unifrom:
*£(15) • D/n for all i. Indeed, uniform rationing occurs whenever the distribution
of market power is equal.
The bound in proposition 3 need not he tight in the case of colleglal
polities [4] . In a colleglal polity, there are players with veto power,
hut these players are not by themselves winning. Suppose n • 10 and any group
of 5 or more sellers which contains seller 1 is winning. Thus Sj 5, The probability
that «?G.ller 1 is pivotal Is .6, so that he is already fully employed when T) • 2.
In general, Sj 5 S2, with equality only In the case of oligarchy. The
following characterization of the rationing equilibrium then emerges, as 0
increases. Beginning with n - 1, and continuing until veto sellers become fully
employed, the probability of getting a job is proportional to market power.
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The proportionality constant is the market demand D, Once the veto players are
fully employed (not later than T) - sj), their distributional weights exceed I.
One then proceeds throuf^h the pover hierarchy until all powerful players are
fully employed (H- sj). Finally, as Dapproaches n. even the powerless get jobs.
Figures 1 and 2 Illustrate these results for some 3 and A-seller rationing market
games.
Taken together, these results have the following implication. Heller
and Starr[7 .Theorem 2] have shown that fixprice markets can be equilibria In
the sense that even agents who are aware of the consequences of their actions
will not change their behavior in an attenot to clear the market. Indeed, suppose
a wage cut is required to restore full employment. Such a move will surely be
opposed by veto power sellers and other powerful sellers who are already
fully employed. If in the ensuing struggle between the higher and lower echelons
of the hierarchy, the higher echelon wins, there is no force within the market
to drive the wage towards its Walrasian level. In this way, wage rigidities
tend to be self-sustaining.
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xjk)
Figure Ic. Probability of employment
for the 3-player majority rule game
vfith 2 veto players.
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A situation which occurs often in practice is one in which there are
two groups of sellers, neither of which has veto power, but one of which has
more market power per seller than the other. To formalize this situation,
denote the two distinct classes by N2- The proportion of each class in the
total selling population is
1 - ii(N) - p(Nj) +
The votln?t strenfsth w of each class satisfies
1 * w(N) «= w(II|^ ) + w(N2) .
E*ery group of sellers S is therefore characterized by Its size u(S) and its
voting strength w(S). Suppose a coalition is winning if its total vote w(S)
satisfies
w(S) - w(SO>^i)+ ^ q,
for a fixed quota q > 1/2. This general situation can be depicted by means
of a T.orenz curve. Figure 3 depicts a situation where 11(^2), while
4
w(Nj^)/u(N2) < w(N2)/m (N2). Here class 2 is both more numerous and relatively
stronger in voting.
For n very large, one can approximate the value allocations of these
market rationing games by the methods of large games [3] .For example,
the distribution of power i^Vj is equal to the distribution of voting weights.
To characterize the value allocation based on this distribution of market power,
consider first the case where n is sufficiently small that ^ • 1 for all sellers
Then the market rationing game is the side-payments game
-14-
Figure 3- Lorenz Curve for 2-class Model
id Votes
w(N^)
wCNj)
$ Sellers
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VjjiS) = min(y(S),D) if S winning
0 otherwise.
Denote by x(S) the jobs allocated to S at the value allocation; x(S) ^ u(S)
and x(S) - (fiVjiCS). Applying the argument of [2] yields
Proposition 4. Given X • 1 for all sellers. Then at a value allocation
(13) x(S) » w(E)mln<q»D)+v(S)mAx (D - q, 0).
The solution with X* 1 terminates when x(N^) reaches y(Nj), if ISfj ds relatively.most
powerful;
D » 1 + cj - nw(Nj)/y (Nj^)
is the critical value of D beyond which is fully employed. For D larger than
this, N2 receives the residual employment
x(N2) = n - m(Si).
Define the unemployment rate for group S to be
(U) U(S) « 1 - x(S)/tt(S),
Tn the region where D exceeds n but still X* l,both groups still suffer from
unemployaent, and the unemployment rate differentials are
(15) - ^KN2) « q ( ^*
from (13), (14).
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As an illustration of (15), take the Soviet Union during the 1920*8,
where there war considerable unemployment both among workers belonging to the
Party, IRj., and among workers with no political affiliation, Nj. According to
data from [10,11 - 1% in 1925 and 4% in 1927, the latter being a year
of considerably greater overall unemployment. Corresponding figures for ^2
are and 127! respectively. An Individual partv member was thus about 8%q more
powerful than his unafflliated counterpart. For q ranging from 1/2 to 1, this
suggests a newer differential of about 8 - 16%.
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IV, Hierarchic Rationing in General Markets
The results in the previous section depended on the fact that desired
supply was the same for all sellers. This section lifts that restrictive
assumption: a seller can have any desired supply. The assumption that sellers
are risk neutral is retained.
Heller and Starr [7] define a hierarchicunechanism with endogenous
hierarchy as follows:
In this allocation function, the short side Is allotted precisely
what it offers. Offers on the long side are arranged in order of size,
smallest (in absolute value) first (a tle-hreaklng rule is of course
neoded).* They are then fulfilled, within the limits of available short
side offers, in that order.
The ma.lor result of this section is that whenev^,market power is equally
distributed on the lonj^ side of the market, the value allocation that results
Is a hierarchic mechanism with endogenous hierarchy.
Proposition 5. Let desired supplies of the sellers be arranged as
< Z2 <**' < Zji (sellers are relabeled if necessary).
Demand Ti satisfies 0 < D < t and market power Is evenly distributed.
Then the value allocation is a hierarchic mechanism with endogenous hierarchy.
Proof. The proof here will be for the case of the Pareto extension
rule, where N is the only winning coalition. The proof for other forms of
equally distributed power is similar.
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Aplayer Is pivotal in a random ordering only if he is last, in which
even his marginal contribution Is Vj^(N). Since hft is last with probability
1/n, at the value allocation
(16) - *vx(i) « 1/n v^CN),
For T) ^ n z^, - 1, - T)/n for all 1 is the value allocation,
since in this case - D.
For nz^ <0 < Zj + (n-1) Z2, Xj - (D - Zj)/((n-l)zi), Xj « Zj,
- 1, - (D-zi)/(n-l) is the value allocation. In this case, vj^ (N) » n(I)-Zi)/(n-l)
Hence,
I/n (D-z^)/(n-l) ,
and (16) is satisfied for all i.
For zi + (n-l)z2< n + Zj + (n-2)z3, X^ • (n-zj^-Z2)/(Ti-2)zj.', - z^,
X2 - (T)-Zi-Z2)/((n-2)z2), X2 - Z2, and for all other 1 X^^ - 1, -(D-zj^-Z2)/(ti-2)
is the value allocation. In this case, v^CN) - n(D-zJ-Z2)/(n-2).
Proceeding Inductively, for
.1-1 3
E zt. + (n-j+l)z. < D < r 2j^ + (n-j)
k-1 ^
one has
~ (n - 1Zfc )/(n-J)Zi , *1 - "ij for 1 < ,1
k«l
X. - 1, x^ - ( D - r zO/(n-1) for i > .1.
- 1
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In this way, a hierarchic mechanism with endogenous hierarchy emerges.
Analogues of propositions I - A continue to hold in this more general
setting. Indeed, propositions I and 7. ro through without any alteration.
All powerful agents' trades are filled before any powerless agents' trades
are. The analogue of result - 3 in this setting goes as follows. Denote by
the mln of Z(S) over all winning S. Let S2 again be the cardinality of the
smallest winning coalition. Then one has
Proposition 6. feet seller 1 have veto power, and ^ z^^"/s2. Then
x^(T>) " for all T) >,
The proof follows precisely the pattern of proposition 3.
MTien the condition on z^^ is not satisfied, even a seller with veto
nower may have to wait for higher levels of demand before fulfilling his
desired trade. For example, suonose z^*6, ^ 2, Seller 1 has veto
power, and any majority containing 1 wins. Notice that = 6 > z'"^"/s2 = 8/2 »* 4,
so that the hypothesis of the proposition falls. A routine calculation shows
that Xj - 1, all D and
for D ^ 8, " 20/3, X2 • "• Tl/6
for D > 8, XI »« (T>+8)/3, *2 " *3 "
is the value allocation. Fven though the veto player is not completely fulfilled,
it is still the case that a larger proportion of his desired trade is satisfied
than for the other traders.
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"Flnally, to generalize proposition 4, suppose each member of class 1
wishes to sell Zj, vrhlle each member of class 2 wishes to sell Z2. T)esired
sales of coalition S then are
z(S) « + z^ViCSON^).
Thus, if X = 1 for all traders, one has the oarket ratlwip? c^ame
Vj^v(S) »= min(z(S),D) if S winning
0 otherwise.
The value allocation is then given by proposition 7;
""ropos'ftion 7. The value allocation for the 2-class model with
?*eneral demands is X « 1,
(17) x(S) * w(S)m1n(nz(N) ,D) + z(S) 7nax((n-rz(N))/z(F), 0),
as long as x(S) < z(S) for all S,
V'hich class is satisfied first depends both on market power w and desired
trade z. The class with the highest ratio of market power to desired trade,
w(N^)/z(N_j^), will be completely employed at the level of demand n equating
to in (17).
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V. Conclusion
This paper has characterized the value allocations of market rationing
5ames under excess supply. The results show how nervasive is the role of
hierarchic rationing at such value allocations. The restriction to excess supn]v
Js not crucial: the results go through without change when excess sunply is
chanjted to excess demand and winning coalitions of buyers are studied. A more
substantive restriction has been the assumption of risk-neutrality. In general,
a risk-averse trader in such a situation will do worse, than his risk-neutral
counterpart. Indeed, It will be in the best interes of a risk-averter to
conceal this fact from the rest of the Tnarket [8] . Finally, all the
results l^ave been framed In the context of a single market. Tt would be nice
to have the t^eneraJ enulllbrium analogues of these 'results in a general
eaullihrium context. A promising attack on this problem would be' to
relate the rationing observed to the coupon enuilibria of ^reze and Miiller.^^^*
There are other possible applications of these results, in particular,
the distribution of bads. Tn the emnloyment model of section III, suppose that
the employment is forced labor, which nobody wants to perform. If resistance
to the system of forced labor is futile, then the results can be reinterpreted
to show that agents with veto pwer are the last to be forced to work for
instance, when n workers must be drafted. However, if resistance to such a
system is possible (draft resistance, work stoppages), then a different
characterization of the market rationing game Is needed, along the lines of
Aumann-Kurz tax theory [2] . Even here, market power helps determine
the resulting value allocation.
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